Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 19, Number 1 (March 1981)

Article 3

Constitutional Aspects of Approval of Share
Transactions
H. M. Kay

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Article

Citation Information
Kay, H. M.. "Constitutional Aspects of Approval of Share Transactions." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 19.1 (1981) : 100-117.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol19/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall
Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF
APPROVAL OF SHARE TRANSACTIONS
By H.M. KAY*
In many provinces in Canada, statutory provisions requiring that a
transfer of shares in companies engaged in a vital industry be approved by
a provincial tribunal are part of the regulatory schemes governing those
industries. Here one is not concerned with provincial securities legislation
generally, but rather with legislation that for the most part deals with the
business in which the companies are engaged.' In the energy field, for
example, provisions prohibiting the transfer of a majority of the outstanding
shares in oil and gas companies without the approval of the provincial public
utilities board or similar body are common. In some cases, the legislation
applies only to companies incorporated in that province, 2 in others it purports
to apply to all companies wherever incorporated.Two problems are created by such provisions. The first and more obvious
is that the provincial tribunal may refuse approval of the particular sale or
transfer of shares. The second problem, just as serious, is that most such
provisions necessitate obtaining approval prior to the sale or transfer of the
shares, and any publicity given to the proposal could well permit the purchaser
to be "scooped" by some other party who might be prepared to risk a challenge to its purchase and this would certainly affect the price of the shares. For
example, in 1974 the White Pass and Yukon Corporation applied to the
Canadian Transport Commission under section 27 of the National Transportation Act4 for approval to make a takeover bid for Pacific Western Airlines
Ltd. The province of Alberta sought no such prior approvals and made a
successful stock market bid for a majority interest before the application could
even be heard. 5
A purchaser can, of course, make a public offering conditional upon
approval by regulatory authorities. However, the offer will not be as attractive
as one that contains no such condition. This is especially so since the approval
must be obtained within a set period of time, which may be difficult to predict
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* Mr. Kay is a partner with the law firm of Bennett Jones in Calgary, Alberta.
I Such legislation makes a distinction between Dominion and provincial companies,
adopting that made by Laskin J. in Kootenay and Elk Ry. Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ry.
Co., [1974] S.C.R. 955 at 1012. 28 D.L.R. 385 at 427-28.
"-E.g.. The Gas Utilities Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 158, s. 25; The Public Utilities Board
Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 302, s. 88.
:1E.g.. Energy Act, S.B.C. 1973 ( Ist Sess.), c. 29. s. 44.
4 R.S.C. 1970, c. N-17.
The Queen v. Cdn. Transp. Comini'n, [1978] i S.C.R. 61, 2 A.R. 539, 75 D.L.R. (3d)
257 [hereinafter Re Pacific Western Airlines]. The Supreme Court of Canada upheld
the position that the Province of Alberta was able to avoid the necessity for approval
since the legislation as it then read did not expressly bind the Crown.
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and could well be outside any extension of the period for taking up the
shares that securities legislation allows.6
As illustrated, the significant question is whether such legislation, purporting to prohibit a sale of shares unless the sale is approved by the specified
regulatory tribunal, applies to every company. The question most frequently
arises with respect to provincial regulatory approval of dealings in federallyincorporated companies. Does a province have the power to rule on share
transactions in any company engaged in activities under provincial control?
Or is provincial legislation that confines itself solely to share dealings in provincial companies unnecessarily restrictive?
I.

SALE OF SHARES IN DOMINION COMPANIES

A.

Dominion IncorporationPowers
The British North America Act, 18677 specifically grants powers with

respect to the incorporation of companies to the provinces under section 92,
head 11, "The Incorporation of Companies with Provincial Objects." The
powers of the Dominion Parliament with respect to the incorporation of
companies is not specified, but the subject matter "incorporation of companies
with objects not provincial" has been held to be a subject falling within the
residuary powers under section 91 as well as under head 2 of section 91,
"The Regulation of Trade and Commerce." 8 Simply put, the principle is that
incorporation of companies with other than provincial objects must fall
within the residuary power since it is excluded from provincial powers by the
very words employed in section 92, especially head 11.
The principal decision on the classification of the Dominion's power to

incorporate companies is John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton.9 The company

was incorporated by letters patent issued under the federal Companies Act. 10
In that case, provincial legislation required every company not incorporated
within the province to obtain a licence, otherwise the company could not
carry on business or bring an action. The Court held that the legislation did
not apply to federally-incorporated companies such as the one in question.
Viscount Haldane L.C. examined first the initial incorporation of the
company (incorporation here in its narrowest sense) and concluded that the
authority of the provinces was confined to head 11 of section 92 and that
the incorporation of companies with other than provincial objects, being
otherwise not expressly assigned, fell to the Dominion under its residuary
OThis problem is twofold. The regulatory process, depending upon the particular
tribunal, may take several months to get to a hearing, let alone a decision. Second, the
securities legislation will not permit the offer to remain outstanding for much more
than a few months, see, e.g., The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 89(1), paras.
8, 13 and 14.
7 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.).
8John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton, [1915] A.C. 330, 7 W.W.R. 706, 18 D.L.R.
353 (P.C.); Great West Saddlery Co. v. The King, [1921] 2 A.C. 91, [1921] 1 W.W.R.
1034, 58 D.L.R. 1 (P.C.).
9 ld.

10 R.S.C. 1906, c. 79.
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powers. He then considered those provisions in the Dominion legislation
concerning the company after incorporation-the power to sue and be sued,
to make contracts and hold property-and found these to be valid federal
legislation as well, but under the trade and commerce power in head 2 of
section 91. While the special office so accorded to the trade and commerce
power may be irreconcilable with other decisions on that power 1 this
decision is the basis of the statements made that Dominion companies legislation falls under the residuary powers and to some extent under the trade
and commerce power.
The extent of federal jurisdiction over share transactions in federallyincorporated companies has been touched on in a line of cases dealing
generally with takeover, compulsory acquisition and similar provisions in
Dominion companies legislation. This line of cases can be most usefully
examined in light of the observation of Mr. Justice Laskin in Kootenay and
Elk Ry. Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co.' 2 There he stated that the constitutional decisions on incorporation powers exhibit a distinction between the
power to "regulate a company qua company and the authority to regulate the
business activity in which a company may be engaged."' 3
In Esso Standard (Inter-America) Inc. v. J.W. Enterprises Inc.,14 the
question was raised as to the validity of the then section 128 of the Dominion
Companies Act' " dealing with takeover bids. Mr. Justice Judson, in giving
the decision of the Court, quoted with approval the following observation in
the Courts below:
It is my opinion that the Parliament of Canada having legislative power to create
companies whose objects extend to more than one Province possesses also the
legislative power to prescribe the manner in which shares of the capital of such
companies can be transferred and acquired. That matter is one of general interest
throughout the Dominion.'O

He went on to comment:
It is truly legislation in relation to the incorporation of companies with other than
provincial objeco and it is not legislation in relation to property and civil rights
in the province or in relation to any matter coming within
the classes of subject
17
assigned exclusively to the legislature of the province.

The Supreme Court of Canada in this decision also approved the reasoning

of the British Columbia courts in Rathie v. Montreal Trust Co.18 In that

11 See Smith, The Commerce Power in Canadaand the United States (Toronto: Butterworths, 1963) in particular at 94-96. Also consider if the term "incorporation" embraces the continued existence of the company as well as its creation, since this and
later cases suggest the assignment of some part of companies legislation to a specific
head under s. 91 may be inconsistent.
12 Supranote 1.
13 Id.
14 [1963] S.C.R. 144, 37 D.L.R. (2d) 598.
15 R.S.C. 1952, c. 53.
16 Supra note 14, at 152 (S.C.R.), 605 (D.L.R.), quoting Laidlaw J.A.
17 Id. at 153 (S.C.R.), 605 (D.L.R.).
18 (1952), 5 W.W.R. (N.S.) 675, [1952] 3 D.L.R. 61 (B.C.S.C.), rev'd on other
grounds, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 204, aff'g (1952), 6 W.W.R. (N.S.)

652 (B.C.C.A.).
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case, the Courts considered the constitutionality of section 124 of the
Companies Act, 193419 similarly dealing with takeover bids. In considering
the submission that the section might be ultra vires the Dominion government,
Mr. Justice Coady commented:
This section, it seems to me, is but necessary incidental legislation and advantageous for the proper functioning of a company incorporated under the Dominion Statute. Similar legislation is found in the provincial Companies Act, RSBC,
1948, ch. 48, applicable to provincial companies only. It is there generally recognized as necessary incidental and advantageous legislation which in effect provides
a convenient way of transferring company undertaking and assets by transfer of
shares. If it is considered necessary incidental legislation there, then it is likewise
necessary incidental legislation in a Dominion company, and if this be so the fact
that this legislation may affect property and civil rights in the province is no
objection. 20

Some general comments concerning the federal power with respect to
the incorporation of companies are also found in the judgment of Chief
21
Justice Duff in Reference re Section 110 of The Dominion Companies Act.
It was observed that the phrase "Incorporation of Companies" could not
"be read in a manner so strict as to limit it to the subject of bringing such
companies into being."22' The Chief Justice went on to "glance" at the state
of the law with respect to the incorporation and management of companies
existing in England at the time of the passing of The British North America
Act, 1867.23 His review of the legislation and comments thereon give a broad
interpretation to the phrase "Incorporation of Companies" in the context of
the division of powers between the federal and provincial governments.
These cases on Dominion incorporation powers appear to place the sale
and transfer of shares in a federally-incorporated company generally within
the jurisdiction of the legislative body which created that company. While the
decisions in Montreal Trust Co. v. Rathie24 state that the sale and transfer
of shares is necessarily incidental to the power to incorporate, the Supreme
Court of Canada in both Esso Standard (Inter-America) Inc. v. J.W. Enterprises Inc. 25 and in Reference re Section 110 of The Dominion Companies
Act 26 appears to say that these matters are in pith and substance a part of the
power to incorporate. The latter, it is submitted, is the correct view.
'Incorporation' means more than merely the act of incorporating the
company, although it is used in this narrow sense even in some of the constitutional cases discussed. The term embraces the continuation of the
company, its maintenance as a company and, it is submitted, its regulation
in those matters which are peculiar to a company.

19 S.C. 1934, c. 33.
20 Supra note 18, at 683 (W.W.R.), 69 (D.L.R.).
21 [1934] S.C.R. 653, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 6.
22
1d. at 655 (S.C.R.), 8 (D.L.R.).
3 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.).
24
Supra note 18.
25
Supra note 14.
20 Supranote 21.
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ProvincialRegulatory Powers
Having considered the scope of the Dominion power to incorporate
generally, one turns to those decisions which have considered the provincial
power to regulate the transfer and sale of shares in federally-incorporated
companies.
B.

A.-G. for Man. v. A.-G. for Can.27 (the Manitoba Securities case) concerned the validity of Manitoba legislation which prohibited any company
from selling or offering for sale shares or stock without a licence, which in
turn required approval of the issue by the provincial Public Utility Board.
The provisions were held to be ultra vires. The subject provincial legislation
was found to interfere "directly and not merely incidentally, in material
respects and to a substantial extent, with the capacity of the company to raise
capital ... and so derogates from its status and consequent capacities as a

Dominion Company." 28 Viscount Sumner commented:

The general effect of these provisions remains. An artificial person, incorporated
under the powers of the Dominion with certain objects, invested by these powers
with capacities to trade in pursuit of those objects and with the status and capacities of a Dominion incorporation, is under these Acts liable in the most ordinary
course of business to be stillborn from the moment of incorporation, sterilized
in all its functions and activities, thwarted and interfered with in its first and
essential endeavours to enter on the beneficial and active employment of its
powers, by the necessity of applying to a Provincial executive for permission to
begin to act and to raise its necessary capital, a permission which may be subjected to conditions or refused altogether according to the view, which in their
discretion that executive may take.... 20

It was recognized that the "subject" of the legislation, the protection
of inexperienced residents in the province from investing their savings in
what might be "ill-designed, ill-equipped and ill-conducted" 30 enterprises,
might well be within the domain of provincial regulation; however, the method
adopted, that of prevention rather than criminal prosecution alone, and its
effect was such as to render the legislation ultra vires. That effect was "to
impair the status and essential capacities of the company in a substantial
degree, 31 the essential capacity here being to raise capital by the sale of
shares. This "status and essential capacities" '32 test is referred to in all subsequent cases. Whether it is the only test, or part of a broader test, was not
dealt with in this decision.
A similar conclusion had been reached by the Supreme Court of Canada
in Lukey v. Ruthenian Farmers' Elevator Co. 33 with respect to comparable
Saskatchewan legislation. The observations of Mr. Justice Duff regarding the
217 [1929] A.C. 260,
Manitoba Securities].
28 Id. at 265 (A.C.),
29
Id. at266 (A.C.),
30 Id. at 265 (A.C.),
31
Id. at 267 (A.C.),
32

[1929] 1 W.W.R. 136, [1929] 1 D.L.R. 369 (P.C.) [hereinafter
139 (W.W.R.), 372 (D.L.R.).
140-41 (W.W.R.), 373 (D.L.R.).
139 (W.W.R.), 372 (D.L.R.).
141 (W.W.R.), 374 (D.L.R.).

Id.

33[1924] S.C.R. 56, [1924] 1 W.W.R. 577, [1924] 1 D.L.R. 706.
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initial incorporating provisions of the Dominion Companies Act3 4 are of
interest:
And I think upon principle no distinction can be drawn between the provisions
of the Act dealing with these subjects and those which imply power to acquire
capital by selling the company's shares; nor do I think any sound distinction can
be drawn between such provisions and those which expressly authorize the company to borrow money on its own credit and to give as security for the money so
borrowed its bonds and debentures charged upon its property.
It is indisputable I think that if the restrictions established by the statute be
validly enacted it is equally within the power of the province to prohibit entirely,
in the absence of a certificate, the sale of shares. There cannot I think be any
distinction in principle from the constitutional point of view between sale by
isolated acts and sale in course of continuous and successive acts. And the learned
judges of the court below have rightly considered I think that the true question
is whether to create such a prohibition is competent to a provincial legislature.3 5

Mr. Justice Duff went on to note that not only did the subject legislation
prevent a Dominion company from exercising its power to obtain capital in
the normal way through the sale of shares, but that this was "the essence
of its design. ' :" ; He recognized, as all the decisions have done, that Dominion
companies are not withdrawn from the operation of provincial laws dealing
generally with those matters which are within the stated objects of the
company. He framed the test in the following manner:
Dominion companies empowered to deal in intoxicating liquors for example are
subject to provincial laws regulating or suppressing the sale of liquor; but such
laws are not laws aimed at Dominion companies as such or at joint stock companies as such and do not in effect or in purpose prohibit or impose conditions
upon the exercise of powers of Dominion companies which are essential in the
sense that they are necessary to enable them in a practical way to function 3as7
corporations according to the constitutions imposed upon them by the Dominion.

It is submitted that two, perhaps overlapping, tests seem to be contemplated here. First, is the provincial legislation, in the broad sense, legislation with respect to the incorporation of companies? Second, will the legislation impair the Dominion company's status or its essential capacities?
Mr. Justice Mignault also held that the provincial legislation was ultra
vires but used the following, single test:
The selling of its stock or bonds in order to obtain the capital necessary to carry
on its business, is an act connected with the very life of a company. Capital is
for the company seeking to obtain it what blood is for the human body. Without
it the company cannot live and carry on its business and capital can be obtained
by the company only by selling its stock or by borrowing money. The Saskatche-

34 R.S.C. 1906, c. 79.
35 Supra note 33, at 72 (S.C.R.), 590-91 (W.W.R.), 712 (D.L.R.). Both Ziegel,

"Constitutional Aspects of Canadian Companies," in Ziegel, ed., 1 Studies in Canadian
Company Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1967) at 159 and Hogg, Constitutional Law of
Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1977) at 353 state that Duff J. was being unnecessarily
restrictive in confining company law to its meaning in 1867. However, was not his
objective to demonstrate that the term "incorporation of companies" embraced much
more than the creation of the company alone even in 1867?
36Supra note 33, at 73 (S.C.R.), 591 (W.W.R.), 713 (D.L.R.).
37 Id.at 74 (S.C.R.), 592 (W.W.R.), 714 (D.L.R.).
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wan statute prevents the Dominion company from selling its stock and bonds or
obtained from' the
other securities unless and until a certificate of approval is.
local government board. This is an interference with the powers conferred on the
company by the Parliament of Canada to carry on its business in the province
of Saskatchewan, and so affects its status. And the legislation cannot be sustained
as coming within property and civil rights, or as being a matter of a merely local
or private nature in the province. It really conflicts with the right of the Dominion
to grant them power to carry on their
Parliament to incorporate companies,
3 8 and
business throughout the Dominion.
In concluding that the sale of shares was part of the Dominion's power

to incorporate companies, the Supreme Court of Canada did not find it
necessary to parade the horrors in the same manner as did the Privy Council.
It is submitted that no such parade is required in order to conclude on the
basis of the status and essential capacities test that the ability of a company
to issue and sell its own shares to the public is vital to its existence.
In Lymburn v. Mayland 9 the Privy Council was able to uphold the

forerunner of our modem securities legislation. Although it is beyond the
scope of this paper to fully examine this area and the extent that modern

legislation can be passed by the provinces, Lord Atkin's statement clarifies
the difference between the nature of the regulatory control which the province
seeks to exercise in securities matters and which it sought to exercise in the
ManitobaSecurities case and the Lukey case:
A Dominion company constituted with powers to carry on a particular business
is subject to the competent legislation of the Province as to that business and may
find its special activities completely paralysed, as by legislation against drink
traffic or by the laws as to holding land. If it is formed to trade in securities
there appears no reason why it should not be subject to the competent laws of
the Province as to the business of all persons who trade in securities. As to the
issue of capital there is no complete prohibition, as in the Manitoba case in 1929;
and no reason to suppose that any honest company would have any difficulty in
finding registered persons in the Province through whom it could lawfully issue its
capital. There is no material upon which their Lordships could find that the
sterilized or its status and essential
functions and activities of a company were
4
capacities impaired in a substantial degree. 0
An important distinction, it is submitted, is that valid provincial securities
legislation is directed at the business of selling or trading in securities and
not at the merits of the issue or sale and purchase, apart from requiring
disclosure of all pertinent information. Lord Atkin, for that matter, may have

envisaged the provincial power as even narrower for he refers to sterilizing
the company in both its "functions and activities," 41 not just functions alone.
However, the reference to activities may have been to its activities as a
corporate body and not its business activities. That interpretation at least
is compatible with later decisions.

:38
Id. at 79 (S.C.R.), 596-97 (W.W.R.). 718 (D.L.R.).
39 [1932] A.C. 318, [1932] 1 W.W.R. 578, [1932] 2 D.L.R. 6 (P.C.). Professor
Hogg, supra note 35, at 353, seems to find the distinction unrealistic. Professor Ziegel.
supra note 35, at 167, seems to have no such difficulty. The "status and essential powers
immunity" which troubles Professor Hogg may simply be what Professor Ziegel labels
as the double aspect doctrine.
40Id. at 324-25 (A.C.), 582 (W.W.R.), 9-10 (D.L.R.).
41 hi. at 325 (A.C.), 582 (W.W.R.). 10 (D.L.R.).
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British Columbia PowerCorp. v. A.-G. of B.C.42 (the B.C. Power case)
summarized the previous decisions as ultimately resting on, "in a practical
business sense," 43 the effect on the company. 44 As a practical matter that is
correct; however it is also submitted that the legislation in question must have
some other claim to be valid provincial legislation (not companies legislation
per se) in order to apply the status and essential capacities test.
In the result, it is true, as Professor Hogg observes, 45 that the legislation
considered by Lymburn v. Mayland46 would prohibit a federal company from
raising capital if it did not comply with the securities legislation, just as the
provincial legislation in the two earlier decisions would have; however, the
approval could be obtained without passing on the merit of the issue, a matter
for the internal management of the company. It was not a matter of company law which purported to apply to Dominion as well as provincial companies and the otherwise valid provincial legislation did not impair "its status
or essential capacities in a substantial degree."
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada confirm the distinction
between regulation of the business engaged in by a company and regulation
of the company as such. They are unclear, however, as to the test or tests to
be applied to determine the latter.
Chief Justice Laskin expressed the principle as follows in Morgan v.
A.-G. for P.E.I.,4 7 which concerned provincial legislation prohibiting nonresidents from holding land in the province:
The issue here is not unlike that which has governed the determination of the
validity of provincial legislation embracing federally-incorporated companies. The
case law, dependent so largely on the judicial appraisal of the thrust of the particular legislation, has established, in my view, that federally-incorporated companies are not constitutionally entitled, by virtue of their federal incorporation,
to any advantage, as against provincial regulatory legislation, over provincial
corporations or over extra-provincial or foreign corporations, so long as their
capacity to establish themselves as viable corporate entities (beyond the mere
fact of their incorporation), as by raising capital through issue of shares and
debentures, is not precluded by the provincial legislation. Beyond this, they are
subject to competent provincial regulations in48 respect of businesses or activities
which fall within provincial legislative power.

The legislation was valid since it merely prohibited a Dominion company,
among others, from holding land within the province; it did not vary or take
away the corporate power to hold land. 4: ' The Chief Justice made the same
(1963) 44 W.W.R. 65, 47 D.L.R. (2d) 633 (B.C.S.C.).
Id. at 139 (W.W.R.), 703 (D.L.R.).
44 Professor Ziegel, supra note 35, at 183, regards the B.C. Power case as the most
careful examination of the law. The principal error in the case is not the review of the
law but the characterization of the expropriating legislation.
42
43

45 Hogg, supra note 35. at 359.
41;
Supra note 39.

4 [1976] 2 S.C.R. 349. 5 N.R. 455.
41' Id. at 364-65 (S.C.R.). 469 (N.R.).
4i' Contrast this decision with that in John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton, vupra note
8. or Great IVest Saddlery Co. -. The King. supra note 8. for esample. rhe provincial
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observation as did Chief Justice Lett in the B.C. Power50 case, that much
depends upon the court's assessment of the effect, the thrust, of the legislation.
It can also be contended that he accepted that the status and essential
capacities test is not the only test. That test is only applicable if the legislation
is not clearly legislation with respect to companies and otherwise appears to
come within one of the other heads under section 92. These same principles
were reaffirmed in Canadian Indemnity Co. v. A.-G. of B.C.5 ' in which the
Court upheld British Columbia legislation instituting compulsory government
automobile insurance. Mr. Justice Martland in that case quoted with approval5 2 the statement of the law found in R. v. Arcadia Coal Co.:
The distinction between enactments affecting Dominion companies that are of
general application and those that may be termed company law is simply this:
In the former case there is no attempt to interfere with powers validly granted
to the company by the Dominion nor with the status of the company as such.
The circumstance that the company consistently with the general laws of the
province may not exercise those powers does not destroy or impair the powers.
In the latter case the enactment prohibits or imposes conditions upon the exercise
of the powers of Dominion companies as such. In short it is aimed at and affects
Dominion company powers as distinguished from being aimed at and affecting a
trade or business in the province which Dominion companies may happen to be
engaged in in common with provincial companies and natural persons.
In the one case the legislation has to do with a provincial matter, Dominion
companies being only incidentally affected; in the other case the legislation is
aimed either at Dominion companies or at all companies which includes Dominion companies, and so the province with power to legislate 5only as to provincial
companies must be said to have entered the Dominion field. 3

The test formulated in the Arcadia Coal54 case makes the same distinction that Chief Justice Laskin did in the Kootenay and Elk Ry. Co. 5 case,
between regulation of the business in which the company is engaged and
regulation of the company qua company. It is not confined to impairment of
the company's status or essential capacities alone; it is broader. It should
also be noted that Mr. Justice Martland described the John Deere, Great
West Saddlery,5 7 Manitoba Securities8 and Lukey" cases as dealing "with
provincial company law or securities legislation and their effect in frustrating
legislation cannot be companies legislation and it cannot deprive the company of some
essential attribute. It would not be correct though, it is submitted, to say that holding
land is not an essential attribute if conferred by the incorporating legislation without
more. That corporate power is no less important than the power to sue, but both can be
subject to provincial fees, licencing and other business regulation.
50
Supra note 42.
51 [1977] 2 S.C.R. 504, 11 N.R. 466.
52 Id. at 518-19 (S.C.R.), 485-86 (N.R.).
53 [1932] 1 W.W.R. 771 at 784-85, [19321 2 D.L.R. 475 at 488, 58 C.C.C. 17 at 30
(Alta. C.A.). This is regarded by Professor Ziegel, supra note 35, at 176-77, as the best
statement of the law.
54 Id.
55 Supra note 1.
56 Supra note 8.
57 Id.
5
8Supra note 27.
59 Supra note 33.
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the effect of federal incorporation." 6 While it is unlikely that his Lordship
was addressing himself to the precise question, if the legislation was provincial
company law then its effect is irrelevant. It cannot apply to Dominion companies, apart from licensing or registration since provincial jurisdiction under
head 11 of section 92 is limited to companies with provincial objects. 61
There remains the anomalous decision in the B.C. Power case 62 concerning the expropriation by the province of British Cloumbia of the shares
in a British Columbia-incorporated utility held by and constituting the major
asset of a federal company. The expropriatory legislation was held to be
invalid as legislation of a company law character or, alternatively, as impairing
the essential status and powers of a federal company. It seems to be generally
accepted that the decision in holding the legislation ultra vires is either wrong
or very much confined to the facts. 63 It does not in any event stand for the
proposition that a provincial law of general character cannot paralyze the
business activities of a Dominion company.
C.

ProvincialApproval of Share Transactions
Having considered then the scope of the Dominion power of incorporation generally and the extent to which the provinces may regulate share
transactions in such companies, it is necessary to determine where the two
jurisdictions meet and the scope for the provincial legislation.
The provincial legislation is obviously concerned with the control of
companies engaged in businesses under provincial jurisdiction, particularly in
closely regulated industries such as utilities and the like. It is directed to both
the issue of shares by the company and subsequent trades in those shares.
The Gas Utilities ActG4 of Alberta is examined as an example of such
legislation. It contains the following prohibition with respect to the issue of
securities:
24(1) No owner of a gas utility shall ...
(e) issue any
(i) of its shares or stock, or
(ii) bonds or other evidences of indebtedness, payable in more than
one year from the date thereof,
unless it has first satisfied the Board that the proposed issue is to be
made in accordance with law and obtained the approval of the Board
of the purposes of the issue and an order of the Board authorizing
the issue .... 65
Go Supra note 51, at 516 (S.C.R.), 482 (N.R.) [emphasis added].

GI The John Deere case clearly establishes that paragraph 11 is the extent of provincial jurisdiction as to companies.
62 Supra note 42.
63 Hogg, supra note 35, at 360-62; Ziegel, supra note 35, at 183-87. The legislation
represented a drastic step, tactically unwise, which was likely the major cause of it
being held ultra vires.
64 R.S.A. 1970, c. 158.
65 Id.
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The definition of owner of a gas utility is not confined to a provinciallyincorporated company and therefore includes, among other entities, a
federally-incorporated company. The section with respect to change of
majority ownership is, however, confined to companies incorporated in
Alberta:
25(1) Unless authorized to do so by an order of the Board, the owner of a gas
utility incorporated under the laws of Alberta, in this section referred to
as the "Alberta companty", shall not sell or make or permit to be made
upon its books any transfer of any share or shares of its capital stock
(a) to any other owner of a gas utility or public utility, within the meaning of The Public Utilities Board Act, or
(b) to any other corporation, however incorporated,
if the result of the sale or transfer, in itself or in connection with other
previous sales or transfers, would be to vest in the other corporation more
than one-half of the outstanding capital stock of the Alberta company.
(2) Every purported
(a) assignment or transfer, or
(b) agreement for assignment or transfer,
by or through any person or corporation in contravention of subsection
(1) is void and of no effect.66

This legislation gives rise to questions whether section 25 should be
confined to Alberta companies, and to what extent; also whether the restriction therein should be reversed so as to apply only to the issue of shares
as opposed to the change of majority ownership.
The approval of the issue of shares by a Dominion company was held in
both the Manitoba Securities0 7 and the Lukey cases to be embraced by the
Dominion power of incorporation. Therefore, to the extent that the provincial
legislation extends to the initial offering, it would seem to be ultra vires. The
two earlier cases considered legislation almost identical in language and intent
to that under consideration here, and there would seem to be no distinction
of merit. Whatever the proper test or tests, the effect of prohibition ought to
be sufficient to render the legislation invalid. Just as in the Manitoba
Securities'9 case, the purpose of controlling the individuals taking over certain
vital industries may be laudable enough but the method adopted would be
to prevent any shares from being issued. The method is directed at companies
as such and is iltra vires in so far as it purports to apply to Dominion
companies.
Another question is whether there is a difference if the legislation purports to regulate subsequent sales after their issue by the company. The
province has a legItimate interest in the control of companies engaged in
industries under its jurisdiction and the personalities involved in the regulated
industries. But what is the concern directed at? What method for protecting
the public has been adopted?
661d.
07
Supra note 27.
0
8 Supra note 33.
69 Supra note 27.
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The power to control, and therefore prohibit, subsequent sales of the
shares could have the same effect as control of the original issue, as described
in both the ManitobaSecurities70 and Lukey 71 cases. The provincial regulatory
tribunal could, by refusal to approve a change of control, affect the market for
the company's slares in a significant way, and have a very decided impact on
the company's ability to raise money.
Takeovers, acquisitions and other subjects of company law may have
a double aspect, as seen -inthe provincial securities legislation, which also
touches on those subjects.7 The decisions upholding Dominion legislation
with respect to the same subjects did not decide that Parliament had exclusive
jurisdiction with respect to all aspects to those matters. Provincial legislation,
the object of which is to provide affected shareholders with general information concerning an offer, would seem valid based on Lymburn v.
Mayland.73 It can certainly control business activities of those engaged, for
example, in the oil and gas industry within the province. On the other hand,
the issuance of shares, compulsory acquisition thereof and other aspects of
the continuing existence of the company are embraced within the power to
incorporate companies with other than provincial objects.
The status of legislation that rules on the character of the purchaser
acquiring control by majority of shares is unclear. Therefore, it is necessary
to determine the proper test or tests with greater precision than was necessary
in the decisions referred to herein, as well as the character of such provisions.
If one simply characterizes .the legislation in question as similar to that
under consideration in the cases concerning the Dominion Companies Act74
referred to above, there are, as stated earlier, two tests for determining the
validity of such legislation. First, broadly expressed, is the legislation company
law per se? If it is, then it comes under section 92 as a valid exercise of
provincial power only in its application to provincial companies. Should it
purport to extend to Dominion companies as well, then itis ultra vires in that
application. Second, assuming that the legislation can make some claim to
legitimacy under one of the heads under section 92, does the legislation impair
the Dominion company's status and essential capacities? In most cases where
this test is applied, the provincial legislation is an attempt to regulate a
particular business or activity within the province's legislative powers. However, it cannot go so far as to impair the company's status or essential
capacities. Its effect then is beyond the power of the province and as such
it is ultra vires. Whether the test is a particular application of the double
aspect doctrine, as Professor Ziegel seems to suggest, it is not necessary to
determine. For the most part it seems to be used as a secondary test to
determine' whether the provincial legislation should properly be classified as

70

Id.

71 Supra note 33.
72 See Ziegel, supra note 35, at 167-7 1.
73 Supra note 39.
74 R.S.C. 1906, c. 79" R.S.C. 1952, c. 53.
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company law or not. While pigeon-holing is not easy, it is submitted that
in the Lukey 75 case this is unnecessary as the legislation is company law.
In most of the others it is an appropriate test for what might otherwise be
valid provincial legislation affecting a particular business or activity.
While one does not normally start with the second test and work backwards, it is submitted that the constitutional questions here can be better
analysed by doing so. That second question is whether, if the provincial
legislation in question is not companies legislation per se, and it is assumed
to otherwise be within provincial legislative competence, does it impair the
company's status or essential powers? The argument is that the effect can be
just the same as in the case of the initial issue of shares by the company;
however, it is one step removed and only involves the acquisition of the
majority of issued and outstanding shares. Once the company has sold its
shares, further sales are subject to provincial legislation of general application,
that is, the law of contract and the like. The distinction has already been
drawn between provincial legislation which deprives a company of corporate
power granted to it by the Dominion and that which prevents it from making
any effective use of that power in a particular province. The practical result
may well be the same; but as a matter of constitutional law it is the difference
between intra vires and ultra vires legislation. It is submitted that if the status
and essential power test was used alone, a court could very well come to the
conclusion that there is no such impairment. If the matter were left to this
test alone, then, the legislation might appear to be intra vires the province.
That takes one back to seeing the status or essential capacities test as merely
part of a broader test of whether the legislation deals with company law as
such.
There appear to be two important distinctions here. First, one alluded to
earlier, is the distinction between the control of the business which the
company is engaged in and control of the company as such. Second, there is
the distinction between provincial laws of general application and company
law as such.
With respect to the first distinction, in Re Pacific Western Airlines--, Mr.
Justice Spence made a distinction between control of the business in which
the company is engaged and control of the company, based upon the language
of the particular regulation. While the decision is directed at a quite different
consideration, it does underline the distinction between changes in shareholdings and the company's conduct in its business. There is a significant
jump from examining the day-to-day operations of the company to examining
the shareholdings in the company and setting aside changes in those shareholdings. While the province has an undisputed right to control the business
in which the company is engaged (at least the businesses in question here)
the ability to control the sale of its shares cannot be said to be necessarily
incidental to the control of the business. What the legislative schemes in
question are directed at is approval prior to the sale. There is no reason why
7-,
Supra note 33.

71;
Supra note 5.
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the legislature or provincial tribunal cannot review the licence or franchise
which the company holds and determine to revoke it if it is dissatisfied with
the new owners. Indeed, the argument is often advanced against government
ownership of industries generally that the power to regulate is so effective
that there is no need to own or similarily control the companies so regulated.
It is submitted that there is simply no necessity for a province to extend its
control over business activities to the review of any changes in shareholdings
in those companies.
The second distinction is between laws of general application and company law as such. There is no doubt that the transfer of shares in any company
is subject to the general laws of contract enforced in a particular province,
but that is equally true of the issue of shares by the company to the public.
While individual contracts for the sale of shares may be void in one province
but not in another by reason of a difference in the general law of contract,
the legislation in question is directed at the takeover or acquisition, a subject
matter which, it is submitted, is quite separate from the individual contract
of sale and purchase.
If the provincial legislation in question is upheld, it would likely be
on the basis that it is part of the regulation of the business in which the
company is engaged. As explained above, it is submitted that there is no
necessity for the province to adopt this particular method for protecting
provincial interests. Unless the provisions in question are so regarded, the
Dominion having given shareholders the freedom to transfer their shares
without its approval, the province cannot superimpose upon that framework
the necessity to obtain provincial approval. Legislation which would take
such freedom of choice out of the hands of the shareholders is of a very
different character from legislation which is concerned with disclosure to
the public, the form of the contract and the like. It invades the field of federal
company law. These two distinctions, it is submitted, come to this: the
legislation, while one step removed, is still aimed at companies and cannot
masquerade under one of the heads in section 92. If it is aimed at companies,
then the province has entered the Dominion field in so far as the legislation
purports to apply to Dominion companies. Or, to adopt the language in the
Lukey 77 case, the "essence of its design" was to strike at the transfer of shares
in a Dominion company which, in the Esso Standard78 case and other cases, 79
was held to be part of legislation not coming within any of the classes of
subject assigned effectively to the provinces.
Can the provincial legislation be underhanded so long as the Dominion
has not passed its own legislation with respect to takeovers and similar
acquisitions? It seems to be a curiously Canadian view that, because the
Dominion has not sought to implement such a regulatory scheme but has left
the shareholders more or less free to sell their shares to whom they choose,
77 Supra note 33.
78 Supranote 14.
70 For example, Rathie v. Montreal Trust Co., supra note 18; Reference re Section
110 of The Dominion Companies Act, supra note 21.
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the field is unoccupied, in that the parties ought to enjoy that freedom unimpaired or that it could have been the intention of Parliament to give them
that freedom. The manner in which shares can be transferred in a Dominion
company is a matter for the Dominion alone and a frontal assault on that
power, which it is submitted this legislation is, cannot be sustained.
It may also be urged, that a takeover or acquisition as such may be ruled
upon by either the Dominion or the provinces, depending upon whether it
has a federal or provincial character. That is, if the takeover or acquisition
of a Dominion company is confined to one province and therefore all of the
individual sales transactions would be governed by the laws of one province,
then it is a matter of property and civil rights within that province and a
proper subject of provincial legislation. On the other hand, if the Dominion
company is traded beyond the bounds of one province and as such involves
individual share transactions in a number of provinces, then the takeover or
acquisition falls either under the interprovincial trade and commerce power
or under the residuary powers of the Dominion. If, as has been suggested,
the takeover or acquisition as such is something different from the individual
contracts for the sale of shares and not divisible, then that creature is beyond
the territorial limit of any one province and, as all powers are divided between
the two levels of government, must fall to the Dominion. While in most cases
the shareholdings will likely go beyond one province, one wonders whether
jurisdiction over the takeover of a Dominion company ought to depend upon
such facts.
Lastly, it may be of interest to consider whether provincial legislation
provisions which purport to void takeovers and acquisitions made without
approval conflict with federal combines legislation. While the purpose or
intent of the provincial legislation is not specified, it is in large measure
directed at reviewing potential monopolies. However, provincial legislation
which might conflict with federal criminal law has been treated very
generously.
In Smith v. The Queen" the Supreme Court of Canada held that
provisions in provincial securities legislation making it an offence to make
false statements in a prospectus did not conflict with the provisions in the
Criminal Code with respect to false statements similarly intended to induce the
purchase of securities. There were no penal consequences attached to the
purchase under the subject provincial legislation. While a broader base may
yet be found for federal combines legislation-the draftsmen of the most
recent proposed amendments must surely not be relying upon the criminal
law power alone-it is unlikely that any conflict will arise in this field.a t
Having considered the ability of the province to rule on the merits of a
takeover or other acquisition in the industries regulated by it, one turns to
consider the position of the Dominion and its jurisdiction over provincial
companies.
80 [1960] S.C.R. 776, 25 D.L.R. (2d) 225, 128 C.C.C. 145.
81 See Henderson, "Recent Development in Competition Law: The Limits of The
Federal Criminal Law Power," [1978] Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures
(Toronto: De Boo, 1978) 109.
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SALE OF SHARES IN PROVINCIAL COMPANIES
Having considered the application of provincial legislation regarding the
issue and sale of shares of federal companies, it should be determined whether
the same position exists between provincial companies and federal legislation.
82
Consider the following provisions in the Aeronautics Act:
II.

15.1(1) From April 4, 1977, an air carrier, operating interprovincially or internationally, shall refuse to allow a transfer of a share of the capital stock

of the air carrier to Her Majesty in right of a province, any agent thereof
or any corporation controlled directly or indirectly by Her Majesty in
right of a province or such an agent to be made in a register of transfers
of shares of the capital stock of the air carrier unless the Governor in
Council has approved such transfer.
be as determined pur(2) For the purposes of this section, "control" shall
s3
suant to the Canada Business CorporationsAct.

There are also provisions in the Air CarrierRegulations84 dealing with
change of control, but the Supreme Court of Canada has determined that these
do not refer to change of control in the company but rather to the day-to-day
conduct of the company's commercial air services.8 5 Whether the draftsmen
of the Regulations intended to distinguish between control of the business in
which the company is engaged and control of the company itself for constitutional or other reasons is perhaps doubtful. Both these provisions and
section 27 of the National TransportationAct,86 though, appear to embrace
a transfer of shares among other transactions which would result in a change
of control or acquisition of an interest.8 7 However, these are matters of interpretation of particular statutory provisions. The question whether and to what
extent Parliament can affect provincially-incorporated companies has not been
the subject of any decisions to date, nor are there any helpful dicta 8 We
must therefore rely upon whatever principles can be distilled from the
decisions discussed in the foregoing.
There is a distinction, of course, between a provincially-incorporated
company's operations within its own province and those outside its boundaries.
Professor Hogg contends that outside its province of incorporation the provincial company is vulnerable to all applicable federal and provincial laws
whether or not they impair its status or essential functions. However, it is
arguable that a provincially-incorporated company is, when registered extraprovincially, in effect re-incorporated in those other provinces and should
therefore enjoy the same immunity from the federal government. For the
present purpose, the problem can be dealt with by referring to a provincial
company acting within its province of incorporation.
82 R.S.C. 1970, c. A-3, s. 15.1, as am. by S.C. 1976-77, c. 26, s. 3.

83 Id.
84 C.R.C. 1978, Vol. 1, c. 3, ss. 21-22.
85 Re Pacific Western Airlines, supra note 5, per Spence J.
86 R.S.C. 1970, c. N-17.
87 In effect this was the finding of Chief Justice Laskin in Re Pacific Western Airlines, supra note 5.

88 Hogg, supra note 35, at 362.
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The decisions on the federal incorporation power reason from the grant
of power to the provinces under head 11 of section 92 that the power to
incorporate companies with other than provincial objects rests with the
Dominion under the residuary powers and to some extent under the trade
and commerce power. It seems implicit in the reasoning that, subject to the
doctrine of paramountcy, the Dominion and provincial powers to create and
maintain companies were the same in their respective fields. The provincial
position appears to be more certain, since it is based upon an entirely specific
grant of power. The reported decisions with respect to federal companies
appear to be concerned with a determination of whether or not the subject
legislation is in fact company law, and are not either specific applications of
the paramountcy doctrine") or (strictly speaking) part of a double aspect test.
If the legislation is company law, then neither level of government's legislation can extend to companies incorporated by the other, at least in the case
of provincially-incorporated companies operations in the province of their
incorporation.
In the case of a primary issue of shares, then, which may well come
within the provisions of the Aeronautics Act,90 the Air CarrierRegulations"'
or the National TransportationAct 92 referred to above, federal legislation
could not prohibit or make void any such issue by a provincially-incorporated
company, just as the converse was true for Dominion companies. In the case
of subsequent sales, acquisition of a majority, controlling interest, the same
difficulties are encountered.93
The question is whether prohibition of certain share purchases in a
company whose business is subject to, in this case, federal regulation is a
proper extension of that federal power. The arguments are the same as set
forth above concerning federally-incorporated companies carrying on an
activity subject to provincial regulation.
There are two observations which ought to be made here. One is with
respect to paramountcy. While the status and essential capacities test developed for federal companies does not appear to be based on paramountcy,
and as such is equally applicable to provincially-incorporated companies, it
does not follow that conflicts will not arise in which the doctrine of paramountcy may apply. However, when examining the sort of legislation under
consideration here, the Dominion regulatory scheme and the provincial
companies legislation are unlikely ever to be found to be inconsistent. As
discussed with respect to the federal trade and commerce power, and combines legislation in particular, the issue will be whether the provisions in the
regulatory statute are within the scope of the regulatory power, or are
embraced within company law.
89 Which, as Professor Hogg notes, would be inapplicable to provincial powers.
90 R.S.C. 1970, c. A-3.
9' C.R.C. 1978, Vol. 1, c. 3, ss. 21-22.
512R.S.C. 1970, c. N-17.
93 This argument was raised before the Supreme Court of Canada in Re Pacific
Western Airlines, supra note 5 and, although not discussed in the decision, was not well
received by the Court.
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The second matter concerns the trade and commerce power, and
whether, as explored above, the power to rule on the merits of a takeover
which involves a purchase of shares spread over several provinces may be a
matter of interprovincial trade and commerce. Given the emasculated position
accorded to the trade and commerce power, it would be surprising if federal
prohibition of a takeover could be seen as a matter of interprovincial trade
and commerce. There is, however, a territorial limitation on all provincial
powers and once the takeover or acquisition assumes a national or international character it may fall outside the jurisdiction of the provinces under
section 92. In such case only the Dominion could have any power to legislate,
whether under a specific head of power or the residuary power. This enters
into the broader question of federal-provincial jurisdiction over security
generally, and is beyond the scope of this paper. However, while the takeover
or acquisition may involve a great number of individual contracts for the sale
of shares, each of which is governed by the general law of a particular
province, the takeover or acquisition as such is not divisible. If it involves
sales in two or more provinces then any part of it cannot be dealt with by a
province. It is not, though, on this analysis, part of the regulation of the
company's business activities. In summary then, in the absence of the takeover having such a national character, the position is that the provincial
company is in much the same position under federal legislation as the federal
company is under provincial legislation.

